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PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATION
SECTION 1.368-1(d): THE CONTINUITY OF
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TEST
John L. Ruppert*
Although continuity of business enterprise has been a require-
ment for tax-free reorganization treatment under Code section 368
for more than two decades, the Internal Revenue Service recently
defined this requirement in proposed Treasury Regulation section
1.368-1(d). This article examines the operative rules and examples
of the proposed regulation in light of existing case law interpreting
the continuity of business enterprise doctrine. The author also dis-
cusses the impact that proposed regulation section 1.368-1(d) will
have on the denial of tax-free reorganization status under section
368(a)(2)(F) to certain transactions involving two or more invest-
ment companies and the prohibition against tax free transfers to a
diversified investment company pursuant to section 351(d).
Continuity of business enterprise is one of three judicial requirements for
tax-free reorganization treatment under section 368 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The most succinct restatement of this doctrine can be found in the
reorganization regulations: section 1.368-1(b) provides that the reorganization
provisions except from taxation those corporate exchanges "which affect only
a readjustment of continuing interest in property under modified corporate
form." Section 1.368-1(c) requires that a plan of reorganization be an ordi-
nary and necessary incident of the conduct of the corporate enterprise and
that it "provide for a continuation of the enterprise." Finally, section 1.368-
2(g) defines a "plan of reorganization" as one involving a transaction or series
of transactions undertaken for "reasons germane to the continuance of the
business of a corporation a party to the reorganization."1 The uncertainties
of this doctrine have added needless complexity to an already highly techni-
cal set of statutory rules and have often served only as a trap for the unwary
taxpayer.
More than two decades after the promulgation of section 368, and
after numerous judicial interpretations of the continuity of business enter-
prise test, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) now proposes to define "con-
tinuity of business enterprise" by adding section 1.368-1(d).2 The proposed
regulation focuses directly on reorganizations in which a closely held corpo-
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois; Member, Illinois and Colorado Bars. B.A.,
Northwestern University; J.D., University of Denver; LL.M. (Tax), New York University.
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1971) also provides: "Exceptions to the general rule [that all
gain realized is to be recognized] are made ... by section(s) ... 354 ... [l]n the case of
reorganizations [the underlying assumption is] that the new enterprise, the new corporate struc-
ture, and the new property are substantially continuations of the old still unliquidated."
2. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d), [1980] STAND. FED. TAX REP. U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
8913 [hereinafter cited as Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:723
ration converts all its operating assets into cash and/or marketable securities
and then transfers these "assets" to a diversified investment company in ex-
change solely for the latter's voting stock. In 1978, the IRS twice privately
ruled that similar stock for assets exchanges qualified as tax-free type (C)
reorganizations 3 tinder Code section 368(a)(1)(C). 4 Proposed Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.368-1(d) would now prospectively deny tax-free reorganiza-
tion treatment to such transactions solely on the ground that they violate the
continuity of business enterprise test.
This Article examines the operative rules and examples of proposed Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.368(d) in the context of existing judicial interpreta-
tions of the continuity of business enterprise doctrine. Attention also is de-
voted to the impact on the proposed regulation of recent legislation in two
closely related areas: the denial of tax-free reorganization status under sec-
tion 368(a)(2)(F) to' certain transactions involving two or more investment
companies and the prohibition of tax-free transfers to a diversified invest-
ment company pursuant to section 351(d). This Article suggests that the
proposed regulation not only departs from prior case law but also violates
the congressional intent expressed in these recently enacted provisions.
3. In Private Letter Ruling 7829097 (April 24, 1978), A sold its television station to an
unrelated party for cash and then transferred its cash to M, a diversified investment company,
in exchange solely for M voting stock. In the event A was unable to sell its remaining active
business assets-certain oil wells-prior to the transfer, A agreed to distribute such assets to its
shareholders. The IRS held that this was a valid I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) reorganization. The IRS
reached a similar conclusion on slightly different facts in Private Letter Ruling 7825045 (March
23, 1978). See note 6 and accompanying text infra. For a brief discussion of these two letter
rulings, see Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relationships, 32 TAX. LAw. 1036, 1051
(1979). It is particularly interesting to note that in Private Letter Ruling 7825045 (March 23,
1978) the IRS concluded that increasing the transferor shareholders' current income, income
stability, liquidity, and diversification all constituted valid business purposes for the transfer.
Moreover, the IRS found continuity of business enterprise to be present based upon the fact
that X continued its present activities and "utilized" the cash received from Y in connection
with its own investment business. Private Letter Ruling 7851066 (Sept. 21, 1978) also involved a
transaction held to be a valid (C) reorganization. In this ruling, Y sold its assets for cash in 1961
and operated as a personal holding company until 1977. In 1977, Y exchanged its cash and
securities solely for voting stock of X, a diversified investment company. See also Private Letter
Ruling 7926150 (March 30, 1979). In this ruling, X sold its assets for cash in 1972 and invested
in municipal bonds. In 1978, X transferred its bonds to Y, an investment company, solely for Y
voting stock. This also was held to be a valid (C) reorganization. For a detailed discussion of all
of these rulings, see Freeman, Leveraged Buy-Outs: Cash Company and Investment Company
Reorganizations, 6 J. CoRP. TAX. 239, 248 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Freeman] (the only
grounds for challenging such transfers are the judicial doctrines of continuity of business enter-
prise and business purpose).
4. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) provides:
In General - [Tihe term reorganization means-
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation;
(C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corpora-
tion which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the
properties of another corporation . ...
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PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATION SECTION 1.368-1(d):
THE OPERATIVE RULES
During 1978, the IRS twice ruled that a taxable sale by a corporation of its
active business assets for cash followed by a transfer of the proceeds to an
investment company, solely for the latter's voting stock, qualified as a tax-
free (C) reorganization. I Private Letter Ruling 7825045, which is represen-
tative of both of these rulings, involved a plan of reorganization in which Y,
a closely held corporation, sold all of its active business assets for cash to
Newco, a newly formed corporation. A, an eleven percent shareholder of Y,
owned seventy-nine percent of Newco's stock, and other key employees of Y
owned the remaining twenty-one percent. Subsequent to the sale of assets
for cash and as part of the same overall plan, Y transferred its assets (now
consisting solely of cash) to X, a publicly held, diversified open-end regis-
tered investment company, in exchange solely for the latter's voting stock. Y
represented that it intended to liquidate within one year of the exchange.
Furthermore, X and Y represented that their purposes for the exchange were
to provide greater liquidity and diversification for Y's shareholders and to
make X's stock a more attractive investment vehicle for prospective
shareholders. The IRS ruled that X's acquisition of Y's cash assets solely for
its own voting stock qualified as a tax-free (C) reorganization. 6
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) rejects the holdings in
Private Letter Ruling 7825045 and its progeny. Revenue Ruling 79-434,7
released in conjunction with the proposed regulation, recharacterizes such
transactions as a taxable liquidation of Y followed by a purchase of X shares
by the former Y shareholders. The ruling purports to reach this conclusion by
a literal interpretation of the continuity of business enterprise doctrine, 8
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) buttresses the conclusion
reached in Revenue Ruling 79-434 by providing that, in order for a transac-
tion to qualify as a reorganization, the transferee corporation must inter alia
either "(i) continue the transferor's historic business (business continuity test)
or (ii) use a significant portion of the transferor's historic business assets in a
business (asset continuity test)." 9
For purposes of the business continuity test, the proposed regulation de-
fines the transferor's "historic business" as its most recently conducted busi-
5. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
6. Private Letter Ruling 7825045 (March 23, 1978). The taxpayer further represented that
Y was not an investment company within the meaning of that term in I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F). The
IRS did not challenge this assertion. See notes 116-134 and accompanying text infra. Moreover,
the IRS never questioned the business purpose for the exchange. See note 3 supra.
7. 1979-53 I.R.B. 14.
8. Id.
9. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (Assumptions Underlying Tax-Free Reorganizations). The
proposed regulation concedes the disjunctive nature of this text: "The transferee is not required
to continue the transferor's business. However, if that business is not continued, there must be
significant use of the transferor's historic business assets in the transferee's business." Id. See
-also id. § 1.368-1(d)(2).
1980]
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ness, exclusive of those activities initiated by the transferor as part of the
overall plan of reorganization. 10 Whether a transferor discontinues its "his-
toric business" and undertakes a new business activity "pursuant to an over-
all plan of reorganization" is a question of fact under the proposed
regulation. 1 Proposed section 1.368-1(d)(3)(i) also provides that a transac-
tion automatically satisfies the business continuity test if the transferee con-
tinues the transferor's "historic business." 12 Although the fact that both
parties to a purported reorganization conduct the same historic business
prior to the reorganization tends to establish business continuity, it is not, by
itself, determinative of the issue. 13 The transferee, however, need only
continue a significant line of the transferor's business if the transferor en-
gages in more than one line of business. 14
The transferee may still satisfy the continuity of business enterprise re-
quirement, even if it fails to continue the transferor's historic business, by
employing a "significant portion" of the transferor's historic business assets in
its own business. 15 Proposed section 1.368-1(d)(4)(ii) defines "historic bus-
iness assets" as those assets used by the transferor in its most recently con-
ducted business. What constitutes a "significant portion" of the transferor's
historic assets will be resolved on a case by case basis. 16
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) and its introductory
comments purport to restate the current continuity of business enterprise
case law. 1 7  To the extent the proposed regulation diverges from current
10. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(3)(iii). To support this position, the proposed regulation cites Workman
v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1534 (CCH 1977). In Workman, however, the issue was whether
the transfer by the parties constituted a § 368 (a)(1)(D) reorganization or a § 337 liquidation,
followed by a contribution of the liquidating proceeds to another corporation. 36 T.C.M. at
1536. The court concluded that a plan of reorganization did not exist. While there is some
discussion regarding continuity of the transferor's business, the court never addressed the con-
tinuity of business enterprise doctrine per se. Id. at 1540. The continuation of the transferor's
business, however, was important in Abegg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 145 (1968), aff'd, 429
F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971). In Abegg, Hevaloid operated as an
active business enterprise until 1956, when it sold all of its assets for cash. In December 1957,
Hevaloid liquidated and distributed its cash and securities to Abegg. Abegg then contributed
these items to Suvretta, a wholly-owned corporation. Since Suvretta continued the management
of Hevaloil's portfolio, the court held that the transaction constituted a valid § 368(a)(1)(D)
reorganization. The Workman court distinguished Abegg on the grounds that the transferor in
Workman owned assets other than liquid investments and the transferor did not voluntarily
relinquish its business prior to the transfer. 36 T.C.M. at 1539. In light of Abegg, even the most
tortured reading of Workman does not support the IRS position in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
1(d).
11. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (Assumptions Underlying Tax-Free Reorganizations).
12. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(3)(i).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(3)(ii).
15. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(4)(i): The proposed regulation only requires the transferee to use
the transferor's assets in a business. Id. 'Apparently this language was meant to pernit the
transferee to use the transferor's assets in the transferee's own business, in a new business, or in
a continuation of the transferor's business.
16. Id. § 1.368-1(d) (Assumptions Underlying Tax-Free Reorganizations).
17. Id. In support of its position, the IRS cites United States v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454
(1938), United States v. Groman, 302 U.S. 82 (1937), Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Con-
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judicial interpretations, however, it relies on the .following statement in the
Report of the House Ways and Means Committee to the 1954 Code: "It
remains true that a corporation may not acquire assets in a tax-free reorgani-
zation with the intention of 'transferring them to a stranger.' "1I It is clear
when this statement is read in context that the Committee only intended by
this statement to sanction certain forms of triangular reorganizations. 1 9
There is nothing in the Report to indicate that the Committee even con-
templated sales of assets followed by a transfer of the sale proceeds for stock
of the transferee. Nevertheless, the IRS now contends that this statement,
in the guise of the continuity of business enterprise test, bars tax-free
treatment for such transfers. 20 The proposed regulation, without discussing
the legitimacy of this contention, takes the Committee's statement even one
step further by providing that "a disposition of the transferor's assets by the
transferee does not differ in result from disposition of those assets by the
transferor." 21 The remainder of this Article tests the basic contention of the
IRS against current judicial and legislative interpretations of the continuity of
business enterprise doctrine.
CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Continuity of business enterprise, as a condition precedent to tax-free
reorganization treatment, originated in two early reorganization decisions,
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner2= and Gregory v. Helvering.23 In
Cortland, the taxpayer transferred substantially all of its properties to the
transferee in exchange for cash and the transferee's notes and claimed tax-
free reorganization treatment. The court determined that the transferor
failed to retain a continuing proprietary interest in the transferee and, there-
fore, held that the exchange constituted a sale, not a reorganization.2 4  In
missioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), and Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 81
(1950), rev'd, 189 F.2d ,332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951). Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1(d) (Related Legislative History). The applicability of these cases, however, is questiona-
ble since they all focus on the shareholder continuity of interest doctrine, not the continuity of
business test.
18. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A134 (1954).
19. This statement was aimed at clarifying the law regarding the proper tax treatment of a
direct transfer of assets to an acquiring corporation's subsidiary in exchange for the acquiring
corporation's stock. Id. Although the Senate Report reiterated the House Report's concern with'
the conclusions of United States v. Bashford, 302 U. S. 454 (1938), and United States v. Gro-
man, 302 U.S. 82 (1937), that a corporation cannot acquire assets in a merger in exchange for the
stock of its parent corporation, it made no reference to transfers to third parties. See S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1954).
20. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (Assumptions Underlying Tax-Free Reorganizations).
21. Id. (Assumptions Underlying Tax-Free Reorganizations). See also id. Example 5.
22. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
23. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff'g, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
24. 60 F.2d at 939-40. Cortland, along with Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609
(1938), are best known for formulating the continuity of shareholder interest doctrine, the third
judicial prerequisite to reorganization treatment. Since Cortland, Congress has legislated stan-
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dicta, the court added the following statement, which is found in section
1.368-1(b) of the present treasury regulations: "Reorganization presupposes
continuance of business under modified corporate forms." 25 Other than this
statement, there is no direct reference in Cortland to the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise test.
In Gregory, the United States Supreme Court indirectly addressed the
business continuity issue again. 26  Mrs. Gregory formed Averill Corporation
solely for the purpose of engaging in a tax-free reorganization with United
Mortgage, another corporation in which she owned one hundred per cent of
the stock. United Mortgage then transferred 1000 shares of Monitor stock to
Averill, and Averill distributed its own voting stock directly to Mrs. Greg-
orv. 27  Immediately thereafter, Mrs. Gregory liquidated Averill, receiving
the Monitor stock in a liquidating distribution, and reported her gain from
the liquidation as long-term capital gain. The IRS contended that the sole
purpose for the creation of Averill was to permit Mrs. Gregory to report her
gain on the receipt of the Monitor shares as capital gain, and, therefore, that
the transitory existence of Averill be disregarded as a sham. 28  The Supreme
Court agreed with the IRS and held that a plan of reorganization did not
include a transfer of assets by one corporation to another pursuant to a plan
having no relation to the business of either corporation. In essence, the crea-
tion of Averill and the subsequent exchange between it and United
Mortgage were "an operation having no business or corporate purpose-a
mere device which put on the form of a ...reorganization as a disguise for
concealing its real character ... [a] transfer of . . . shares to [Mrs. Greg-
ory]. . . .The whole undertaking ...was in fact an elaborate and devious
form of conveyance masquerading as a ... reorganization .... "29
Subsequent courts, relying on Cortland and Gregory, have required tax-
payers to demonstrate continuity of business enterprise in order to qualify
for tax-free reorganization treatment under section 368.30 Unfortunately,
dards regarding the nature and amount of permissible consideration in I.R.C. §§
368(a)(1)(B),(C),(D) and 368(a)(2)(D),(E),(F) reorganizations. For a recent discussion of the con-
tinuity of shareholder interest concept, see Hutton, Musings on Continuity of Interest-Recent
Developments, 56 TAxEs 904 (1978). For a detailed review of the doctrine, see B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 14-11 (1979).
25. 60 F.2d at 940. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(1955).
26. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff'g 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
27. 293 U.S. at 467 (allegedly tax free under the predecessor to § 354). I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation which is a
party to a reorganization are exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or
another corporation which is also a party to the reorganization. This provision, however, is
subject to the boot rules of I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2) and 356.
28. 293 U.S. at 467-68. The IRS contended that United Mortgage distributed the Monitor
stock directly to Mrs. Gregory as a dividend. Id. at 468. The IRS took this position despite the
fact that the exchange literally complied with all the requirements of I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B)'s
predecessor.
29. 293 U.S. at 469.
30. I.R.C. § 368. See, e.g., Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9177, at 83235
(3d Cir. 1980), aff'g, 70 T.C. 86 (1978); American Bronze Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
[Vol. 29:7"23
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neither Cortland nor Gregory offers any guidance as to the precise meaning
of this concept. The reference in Cortland to continuity of business enter-
prise was merely dicta. In Gregory, the transferee engaged in no business
whatsoever either prior to or after the purported reorganization. Thus, the
facts in Gregory presented the simplest and most obvious example of a
transaction completely lacking in business purpose. The major shortcoming
of both decisions is that neither addressed the more difficult issues of whose
business or how much business the transferee must conduct in order to
satisfy the continuity of business enterprise test, or when continuity of busi-
ness enterprise is to be determined. Neither decision clearly distinguished
business continuity fi'om the broader concept of business purpose. Since
Gregory, courts have focused on all of these issues. As might be expected,
the IRS has argued in favor of a very narrow definition of the business con-
tinuity test while taxpayers have argued in support of a very liberal defini-
tion.
Early Reorganization Decisions: Development of
the Continuity of Business Enterprise Doctrine
At the very minimum, continuity of business enterprise presupposes some
business activity on the part of the corporation surviving the purported reor-
ganization. Beginning with Graham v. Commissioner 31 and Standard Reali-
zation Co. v. Commissioner, 32 the courts have consistently held that a trans-
fer fails the continuity of business enterprise test if the transferee's sole
post-reorganization activity consists of completing the liquidation of the
transferor. a Liquidation of the transferee following completion of the
1111, 1124 (1975); Becher v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 932, 941 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1955); Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1080, 1085-86 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 646
(1st Cir. 1949). See also Tarleau, "Continuity of Business Enterprise" in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions and Other Corporate Readjustinents, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 792, 795-99 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Tarleau] (traces the origins of the continuity of business enterprise test).
31. 37 B.T.A. 623, 629-30 (1938), acq. 1938-2 C.B. 13. In Graham, Illinois Pacific Coast
Company (IPCC) sold all of its assets to Owens Illinois Pacific Coast Company for $5,600,000 in
cash and bonds. IPCC then transferred its remaining $302,000 of accounts receivable and bonds
to Container Securities, a newly formed corporation, in exchange solely for the latter's voting
stock. The court determined that the sole function of Container was to liquidate IPCC's remain-
ing assets and, therefore, held that the transaction was not a reorganization.
32. T.C. 708 (1948), acq. 1948-2 C.B. 3. The transferor in Standard Realization adopted a
plan of liquidation and began selling its assets for cash On March 23, 1943, the transferor
distributed $448,480 to its shareholders, and on May 21, 1943, distributed its three mills and
cash to three shareholders who were acting as agents for all of its shareholders. On May 22,
1943, the shareholders formed a new corporation and transferred the mills to it in exchange
solely for its voting stock. The transferee sold all three mills by October 1943 and liquidated in
1946. Id. at 711-12. The IRS characterized the transfer as a § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization and
computed the transferee's gain on the sale of the mills using the transferor's lower carryover
basis. The court, relying on Graham, held that no reorganization had occurred. Id. at 715. For
a discussion of Standard Realization, see Tarleau, supra note 30, at 799-801.
33. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970); Pebble Springs
Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 836 (1956); Liddon v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1220 (1955), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Becher v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Estate of Hill v. Commissioner,
19801 729
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liquidation of the transferor is the single most important indicia of lack of
continuity of business under the rationale of these cases.34
While the courts have required the transferee corporation to a purported
reorganization to engage in some business activity following the transfer,
they have been surprisingly liberal in defining the minimum requirements of
the "some business activity" test. The first decision to discuss continuity of
business enterprise, Morley Cypress Trust v. Commissioner,3 5 involved a
taxpayer who owned shares in Morley Cypress Company, a corporation en-
gaged in the timber business. In 1926, Morley discontinued its timber oper-
ations and commenced dissolution proceedings under state law. Between
1935 and 1939, Morley sold all of its assets for cash, except for a parcel of
land, and made liquidating cash distributions to its shareholders. 36 In 1938,
experts discovered oil on the corporation's remaining land. Thereafter, Mor-
ley formed Southern Land Products Company to extract the oil and develop
the property. Morley then transferred the land to Southern, which, in re-
turn, distributed its stock directly to Morley's shareholders. The IRS argued
that the transferor's shareholders received the transferee stock in a taxable
liquidation of the transferor, not in a tax-free reorganization. The court con-
cluded, however, that the transfer constituted a valid reorganization because
Southern had engaged in an active business enterprise following the transfer
and because a portion of the investment of Morley's shareholders remained
in corporate solution.
3 7
In Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 38 the Tax Court elaborated on the
continuity of business concept. The transferor corporation, Traverse Street,
engaged in three different lines of business. In July 1941, it sold two of its
lines of business for $325,000 in cash and marketable securities. In December
10 T.C. 1090 (1948); Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 646
(1st Cir. 1949); Palmer v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1043 (1942). One author has accurately
stated that none of the cases following Standard Realization have relied on the business purpose
test. See Tarleau, supra note 30, at 800.
34. As recently as 1978, the Tax Court reaffirmed the Standard Realization rationale and
stated:
Some cases have approached the problem in the context of termination of the trans-
feror's business and transfer of its assets to a newly formed . . . corporation for the
sole purpose of disposal of those assets .... These cases have . . . held that no reor-
ganization occurred because no business of any kind was conducted by the trans-
feree . . . after the transfer.
Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1979), aff'd, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9177 (3d Cir. 1980).
See also Freeman, supra note 3, at 30 (no business of any kind was conducted by the transferee
after the transfer).
35. 3 T.C. 84 (1944), acq. 1944 C.B. 20.
36. Id. at 85. Unfortunately, the opinion does not state the percentage of the transferor's
total assets represented by the value of the land.
37. Id. The court noted that the purpose "of the reorganization provisions is to omit from
tax a change in form and to postpone the tax until there is a change in substance or a realization
in money." Id. at 86. Of course, the transferor's shareholders were taxed on the cash distribu-
tions to them.
38. 10 T.C. 1080 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 29:723
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1941, Traverse adopted a plan of complete liquidation and distributed
seventy-seven percent of its aggregate pre-reorganization assets, consisting
primarily of cash and securities, to its shareholders. As part of this plan,
Traverse also formed a new corporation, John D. Lewis Company, to which
it transferred its remaining assets, the one business line, in exchange solely
for the latter's voting stock. Thereafter, the transferee continued Traverse's
business until late 1944, when it sold the bulk of its assets and liquidated. 39
The Traverse shareholders reported their 1941 liquidating distributions as
long-term capital gain. The IRS contended that the transfer of assets by
Traverse to Lewis constituted a (D) reorganization 4 0 and that the cash
distributed by Traverse to its shareholders was taxable as ordinary income.
The court, holding for the IRS, emphasized that, unlike the transaction in
Standard Realization, the transferee corporation had in fact continued one of
the transferor's businesses for three years, the transferee had operated a
portion of the transferor's assets, the transferor's shareholders retained a con-
tinuing proprietary interest in the transferee, and, unlike the transaction in
Gregory, a valid business purpose existed for the transfer. 41 The Lewis
court knew of no case involving similar facts in which tax-free reorganization
treatment had been denied. 42
In Becher v. Commissioner,4 3 the Tax Court extended the rationale of
Morley Cypress Trust and Estate of Lewis and further circumscribed the
rationale of Standard Realization. In 1945, Sponge-Aire, a manufacturing
concern, adopted a plan of liquidation and began selling its assets for
cash.44 In the meantime, Sponge-Aire's controlling shareholder had be-
come interested in the manufacture of upholstery, but had concluded that
operation of such a business by Sponge-Aire would be impossible. There-
fore, Sponge-Aire's shareholders formed Chandler Corporation solely for the
39. The transferor's lines of business were the manufacture of chemicals, the manufacture of
resins, and the distribution of chemicals. Id. at 1082. An unsuccessful attempt was made in 1941
to sell all three lines of business to the same purchaser, Hercules Powder Co. Because Hercules
would only purchase one of the businesses, the transferor transferred its chemical business to
the transferee in order to facilitate both the liquidation of itself and the search for another
purchaser. Id. at 1084.
40. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) defines a (D) reorganization as:
[A] transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if
immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders
(including persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any
combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are trans-
ferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualified
under sections 354, 355, or 356.
41. 10 T.C. at 1087. As stated by the appellate court: "The controlling factor . . . is that a
basic element of the plan was the continuance of the chemical manufacturing business in the
.. . shell of the new company, with the gain . . . not . . . sufficiently crystallized for recognition
because the collective interests of the shareholders still remained in solution." 176 F.2d at 649.
42. 10 T.C. at 1088. Even the proposed regulation would not deny reorganization treatment
to such a transaction. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example (1) (presents facts identical
to those of Lewis, but holds that continuity of business enterprise is satisfied).
43. 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
44. By December 15, 1945, only 12 of its sewing machines remained unsold. Id. at 934.
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purpose of engaging in such a business. Thereafter, Sponge-Aire distributed
$149,000 in cash to its shareholders, retained $482,000 in cash to meet its
outstanding liabilities, 4s and transferred its remaining assets, consisting of
$125,000 in cash and $94,000 worth of delinquent accounts receivable, out-
dated inventory, a building, and machinery, 46 to Chandler. In return,
Chandler assumed $48,000 of Sponge-Aire's liabilities and distributed its vot-
ing stock directly to the latter's shareholders. 4 7 The taxpayer argued that
the cash distribution from Sponge-Aire constituted a liquidating distribution,
taxable at capital gains rates. The IRS, however, contended that the entire
plan constituted either a (C) or (D) reorganization and any cash received by
the taxpayer should have been taxed as a dividend under the predecessor to
Code section 356.48
The Tax Court focused on the "continuation of business" language in Greg-
orj and Cortland. The court concluded that nothing in the reorganization
provisions required Chandler's post-transfer business to be similar to Sponge-
Aire's former business. 49  The court did not consider it significant that the
assets transferred to Chandler consisted primarily of cash and properties to
be converted into cash. 50 The court believed that the holding in Morley
Cypress Trust, wherein the transferor also had ceased operations and liqui-
dated most of its assets prior to the transfer, was controlling. 51 The court,
however, did attach significance to the following factors: (1) Chandler had
been created to carry on a business, not simply to complete the liquidation
of Sponge-Aire's assets; (2) the same shareholders that controlled Sponge-
Aire prior to the transfer remained in control of Chandler following the
45. Id. at 937. This amount represented cash on hand from the transferor's sale of its operat-
ing assets.
46. Id. The accounts receivable possessed no value as collateral for loans, the inventories
were materials that could not be returned to the transferor's prime contractors, and the building
was carried on the books at zero dollar value since it had been fully depreciated in prior years.
id.
47. Id. at 936-37.
48. Id. at 940.
49. Id. at 942.
50. The court conceded that Sponge-Aire only transferred assets, not a going business, to
Chandler. Id. at 941. Becher represents a subtle but important extension of Lewis in so far as
the transferee in Becher failed to continue the transferor's business and employed none of the
transferor's historic business assets in its own activity. The two decisions, however, may be
reconciled. After all attempts to sell the transferor's building failed, the transferee in Becher
altered it for use in its own furniture business. Chandler liquidated Sponge-Aire's outdated
inventory by using it to produce various tents 4nd floats. To this extent, Chandler did use some
of the transferor's historic business assets. Id. at 939. The Becher court, however, never gave
this analysis any credence. For a discussion of Becher, see Tarleau, supra note 30, at 805-06. See
also Freeman, supra note 3, at 250.
51. 22 T.C. at 941. In fact, the transferor in Morley had liquidated 12 years before its
reorganization. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra. The tension between the facts of
Morley and the facts of Becher that the Becher court failed to discuss results from the theoreti-
cal difference between a transfer of operating assets and a transfer of cash. In Morley, the only
asset transferred was the land. The transferor distributed all of its cash to its shareholders. 3
T.C. at 84. In Becher, however, cash and rights to receive cash accounted for 90% or more of
the net assets transferred. 22 T.C. at 936-37. Clearly, the latter seems more like a sale.
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transfer; (3) the investment of Sponge-Aire's shareholders remained in cor-
porate solution; and (4) a sound business purpose existed for the reorganiza-
tion. 52 The court easily distinguished the facts of Standard Realization, and
concluded that the transfer by Sponge-Aire to Chandler constituted a valid
(D) reorganization.5 3
Becher, Morley Cypress Trust, and Estate of Lewis all played a major role
in Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner. 54 Pebble Springs de-
cided to dissolve and sell all of its assets at a public auction. To prevent a
sale at sacrifice prices, however, Pebble Springs formed a new corporation,
Old Peoria, to make a minimum bid on the assets. The president of Pebble
Springs, as the agent for Old Peoria, purchased the assets at the auction for
the minimum bid and immediately conveyed the assets to Old Peoria. 55
Thereafter, Old Peoria leased portions of the Pebble Springs plant as storage
space to various lessees. 56 The Tax Court held that a valid (D) reorganiza-
tion had occurred. The court interpreted Morley Cypress Trust and Becher
as only requiring Old Peoria to actively operate a business following the
transfer in order to qualify for tax-free reorganization treatment. 57  The ap-
pellate court affirmed the Tax Court and added that "the statute [does not]
make the amount of property transferred to a new corporation a decisive
factor in determining whether a reorganization took place." 58
In Revenue Ruling 56-330,59 the IRS attempted to extend the Standard
Realization60 rationale beyond its particular facts and intimated that con-
tinuity of business enterprise required the transferee to a purported reor-
ganization to conduct the same activities following the transfer as the trans-
feror had conducted prior to the transfer. In the ruling, three corporations
transferred substantially all of their assets to newly formed M corporation
52. 22 T.C. at 941. The court stated: "The important fact is that Chandler was created to
carry on . . . business indefinitely ...." Id.
53. Unlike the transferee in Standard Realization, Chandler did conduct business for 18
months following its incorporation. Id. at 938-39. For a discussion of Standard Realization, see
note 32 and text accompanying notes 31-34 text supra.
54. 23 T.C. 196 (1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956).
55. Id. at 198. The transferor's assets consisted of $1.7 million in whiskey inventory, plant,
fixtures, machinery, goodwill, labels, and brand names. Id.
56. Id. at 199. It would appear that the transferor engaged in no other business activities.
Id.
57. The facts of Pebble Springs, Morley, and Estate of Lewis are very similar. In all
three decisions, the transferee used some portion of the transferor's historic business assets in
its own income generating activities. In none of these decisions did the transferor transfer cash
to the transferee. See notes 35-42 & 54-57 and accompanying text supra. The court's reliance
upon Becher, however, seems misplaced. In Becher, the transferor transferred primarily cash,
not operating assets. Furthermore, the transferee did not continue any part of the transferor's
business. See notes 43-53 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, as in Pebble Springs,
Morely, and Estate of Lewis, the shareholders in Becher left a portion of their investment in
corporate solution.
58. 231 F.2d at 292.
59. 1956-2 C.B. 204.
60. See note 32 and text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
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solely for voting stock of M. Included among the assets transferred were the
cash proceeds from certain properties sold by the transferors prior to the
transfer. 61 The IRS denied reorganization status to the transfer on the
ground that M engaged in a business "entirely different" from the activities
carried on by the transferor corporations. 62 The IRS glibly dismissed the
holding in Becher as "based on facts and circumstances different from those
here involved and ... not controlling in the instant case." 63
The IRS litigated its position in Revenue Ruling 56-330 in Bentsen v.
Phinney. 64  Bentsen involved a transfer by three corporations of substan-
tially all of their real estate and investment assets to a newly formed insur-
ance company in exchange for the latter's voting stock. The IRS disallowed
reorganization treatment to the taxpayer on the ground that the transferee
did not engage in the "same identical or similar business" as the trans-
feror. 65  The court, relying primarily on Morley Cypress Trust and, to a
lesser extent, on Pebble Springs and Becher, rejected the holding in Rev-
enue Ruling 56-330 and held that prior decisions only required the trans-
feree to continue a business following the transfer.66
The IRS, faced with a growing body of contrary precedent, revoked Rev-
enue Ruling 56-330 in Revenue Ruling 63-2967 and held, contrary to
the position espoused in its new, proposed regulation, that the surviving
61. 1956-2 C.B. at 205. The ruling failed to indicate the percentage of the total assets trans-
ferred represented by the cash or cash equivalents. Id.
62. Id. at 206. It should be noted that the Revenue Ruling 56-330 concluded that Becher
was not controlling for it had been "based on [different] facts and circumstances," but failed to
identify the specific differences. Id. It has been speculated that in Becher, unlike Revenue
Ruling 56-330, the change in business was not accompanied by a change in ownership. See
Tarleau, supra note 30, at 806. There is nothing in Rev. Rul. 56-330, however, to warrant such
an interpretation. There is an unpublished ruling in which the IRS cited Revenue Ruling 56-330
for the position that reorganization status would not apply if the transferee, immediately follow-
ing a purported reorganization, disposed of more than 20% of the transferor's assets. See id. at
793. The private ruling focused on the real issue of whether the transfer of cash was equivalent
to a transfer of operating assets. Id. See also Important Points for Practitioners in Corporate
Tax Rulings on Review, 5 J. TAx. 149 (1956) (Rev. Rul. 56-330 must be read in light of Becher).
In Private Letter Ruling 58080086760A (Aug. 8, 1958), the IRS expanded on Revenue Rul-
ing 56-330. In this ruling, the IRS held that where the transferor sold its assets prior to the
purported reorganization, it had de facto liquidated. Because the transferor carried on no busi-
ness at the time of the purported reorganization, the transferee could not be deemed to have
continued the transferor's business.
63. 1956-2 C.B. at 206.
64. 199 F Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
65. Id. at 366.
66. As in Morley and Pebble Springs, the assets transferred by the transferor consisted
primarily of.operating assets. Id. at 364-65. It is not clear from the opinion, however, what the
transferee insurance company did with the transferor's assets. Presumably the transferee used
the land in its business, because if it had disposed of the property, the IRS might have raised
the 20% disposition rule. See Tarleau, supra note 30, at 793; note 62 supra.
67. 1963-1 C.B. 77. In conjunction with the release of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d), the
IRS suspended Revenue Ruling 63-29. Rev. Rul. 79-433, 1979-53 1.R.B. 13 (pending completion
of the proposed regulation).
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corporation in a (C) reorganization need not continue any of the activities
conducted by its predecessor. The facts of the ruling, however, present an
interesting twist on this issue. Prior to the reorganization, the transferee, a
toy manufacturer, sold all of its assets for cash. Thereafter, the transferee,
for valid business reasons, acquired all of the property of the transferor, a
steel distributor, solely for its own voting stock. The transferor then distrib-
uted the transferee stock to its shareholders and liquidated. Even though the
transferee had disposed of substantially all of its assets prior to the reorgani-
zation and, itself, had no active business at the time of the transfer, the IRS
concluded that the transferee's continuation of the transferor's business satis-
fied the continuity of business enterprise requirement.68
Revenue Ruling 63-29, read in conjunction with the Becher decision,
marks a watershed in the continuity of business enterprise precedents. The
ruling postulated the inverse factual situation to that found in Becher, but
reached a result entirely consistent with Becher. Revenue Ruling 63-29 reaf-
firms the holding in prior decisions that continuity of business enterprise
only requires the transferee to purported reorganization to engage in some
business activity, using some of the business assets of the transferor, follow-
ing the transfer. 69  Conspicuously absent in the ruling is any reference to
restrictions imposed by the continuity of business enterprise doctrine on the
nature of the assets exchanged by the transferor or on the nature of the
business conducted by the transferee following a purported reorganization.
Thus, the ruling is consistent with all of the prior cases from Estate of Lewis
through Becher, each of which also ignored the nature of the assets ex-
changed by the transferor and focused instead on the alleged business pur-
pose for the transfer and the presence of some business activity involving
use of some of the transferor's assets on the part of the transferee. 70
Summarizing the early reorganization decisions from Graham and Stan-
dard Realization through Revenue Ruling 63-29, the following conclusions
may be drawn:
68. 1963-1 C.B. 77. The holding of the ruling is much broader than it needed to be. While
the ruling's example involved only a stock for assets exchange, the holding was not limited to
that particular type of reorganization. One author has suggested that the ruling also should be
applied to reorganizations under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), (B) and (D). See Ross, Caution in Using
"Continuity" Rule of Rev. Rul. 63-29 for Corporate Divisions, 21 J. TAx. 130 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Ross]. See also Freeman, supra note 3, at 251 (presumably, the result would not have
differed in Rev. Rul. 63-29 if the transfer had liquidated the transferee's assets).
69. United States v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc., 400 F.2d 737, 743 (8th Cir. 1968), aff'g 67-1
U.S.T.C. 9289 (D. Ark. 1967), succinctly summarized the holding in Rev. Rul. 63-29, stating
that it: "discloses that the surviving corporation must be engaged in a business ... but also
makes clear that [it] 'need not continue the activities conducted by its predecessor.' All that is
required . . . is that the survivior continue . . . some business activity." Id. However, in none
of these decisions, including Becher, did the court focus on the nature of the assets transferred
by the transferor.
70. See, e.g., Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d at 292-93 (a business
purpose existed since the transferee had the authority to engage in the real estate and distilling
businesses); Becher v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. at 941 (business purpose was found to be pres-
ent); Estate of Hill v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. at 1095 (transferee's business purpose was to
engage in new investment activity); Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 10 TC.; at 1086-87 (busi-
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(1) If the transferor only conducts a single line of business prior to the
purported reorganization, the transferee may satisfy the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise doctrine by:
(i) continuing the transferor's business,
(ii) using some portion of the transferor's assets in its own business,
or
(iii) using some portion of the transferor's assets in a new business;
(2) Similarly, the transferee may sell its own assets and use the transferor's
assets in a manner described in (i), (ii), or (iii) above;
(3) If, prior to a purported reorganization, the transferor engages in more
than one business, continuity of business enterprise requires no inore than
if the transferor had only engaged in only a single line of business before
the transfer;
(4) The nature and quantity of the assets transferred by the transferor
should be irrelevant if the purported reorganization satisfies the business
purpose and continuity of shareholder interest doctrines and complies with
all of the statutory reorganization requirements;
(5) Sale of the transferor's operating assets prior to a purported reorganiza-
tion will not affect the reorganization status of a subsequent exchange; and
(6) A sale of all or a portion of the transferee's assets will not affect a
subsequent exchange.
(7) However, if the transferee immediately liquidates following the pur-
ported reorganization, the prior tax-free exchange will be treated as a tax-
able sale of assets.
Recent Reorganization Decisions: Confusing Business
Purpose with Continuity of Business Enterprise
The distinction between the business purpose and the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise doctrines, a distinction which the Supreme Court failed to
articulate clearly in Cortland and Gregory, has become even less clear in
recent reorganization decisions. Recent decisions, beginning most notably
with American Bronze Corp. v. Commissioner7 1 in 1975, have merged the
two doctrines into a new, more pervasive business purpose concept. 72 The
hallmark of this new doctrine is the symbiotic relationship between the old
business purpose and continuity of business enterprise tests. Implicitly,
questionable business purpose has become a major indicia of a lack of con-
tinuity of business enterprise and vice versa. Conversely, the courts have
ness purpose was to continue the transferor's activity with reduced capitalization); Morley Cy-
press Trust v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. at 85-86 (purpose was to develop oil reserves). One author
states that "whatever may be the precise meaning of the business purpose test, its requirements
are satisfied when the new corporation actually engages in the active conduct of some busi-
ness. . . . Nevertheless, . . . the reorganization regulations treat . . . [the two] as two separate
tests." Tarleau, supra note 30, at 804. Summarizing Becher and Morley Cypress Trust this
same commentator concluded that a change in the business conducted by the transferor may
raise a question as to the business purpose for the transfer. Id. at 807.
71. 64 T.C. 1111 (1975).
72. See text accompanying notes 74-116 infra.
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been more lenient in enforcing the business continuity test where the par-
ties have been able to demonstrate a valid business purpose for their trans-
action. 73 Despite confusion of the business purpose and business continuity
doctrines, however, the post-1963 case law has not retreated from the prin-
ciples of Becher and Revenue Ruling 63-29, with respect to the nature or
amount of assets that may be transferred tax-free under section 368.
American Bronze Corp., an example of the new business purpose test,
involved two wholly owned corporations. The transferee company engaged
in the jobbing business and the transferor company conducted both jobbing
and manufacturing activities.7" Prior to a purported merger, the transferor
sold its manufacturing business to an unrelated third party for cash. The
issue before the court was whether the later transfer by the transferor of its
jobbing business and the cash proceeds from the sale of its manufacturing
business to the transferee constituted a valid tax-free merger, such that the
transferee properly carried forward the transferor's pre-merger losses under
Code section 381(a).75 The court concluded that the nature and amount of
assets sold by the transferor prior to the merger was irrelevant; the facts
indicated that the transferor had remained in the jobbing business between
the cash sale and the merger and, following the merger, the transferee had
actively engaged in its own jobbing business. 76 Relying on Becher and Rev-
enue Ruling 63-29, the court concluded that the transfer constituted a valid
tax-free merger. 77
American Bronze represents little more than a modern day restatement of
the holding in Estate of Lewis. In both cases, the transferor engaged in
multiple businesses prior to the purported reorganization and continued only
one of those lines of business afterwards. Notwithstanding these facts, the Tax
Court in American Bronze went beyond the analysis in Estate of Lewis and,
in a footnote, questioned whether the merger would have lacked business
purpose if the transferor had completely discontinued its jobbing activities
following the cash sale of its manufacturing business. 78  This statement is
superficially appealing but somewhat confusing. If continuity of business en-
terprise and business purpose are separate and distinct requirements under
Code section 368, then the absence of either, in and of itself, is sufficient
ground for the courts to deny tax-free reorganization treatment to the
transfer. Yet, the American Bronze court intimated that lack of business con-
73. See note 70 supra.
74. Because after the merger the transferee was actively engaged in the conduct of its job-
bing business, the requirement of continuity of business enterprise was satisfied. 64 T.C. at
1123-24.
75. I.R.C. § 381. This section governs the carry forward of corporate attributes by the trans-
feree corporation following certain types of reorganizations and liquidations. Id.
76. 64 T.C. at 1123-24.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1125 n.10.
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tinuity is merely one indicia of lack of business purpose. To this extent,
American Bronze departs, in language, if not in substance, from prior case
law's interpretation of the interrelationship of these two doctrines. American
Bronze, however, does not retract from the position in Becher or Revenue
Ruling 63-29, 7' that the nature and quantity of assets sold by the transferor
has no impact on the tax-free nature of a subsequent reorganization. Ameri-
can Bronze simply reaflirms the long-standing rule that continuity of busi-
ness enterprise only requires the transferee to use some of the transferor's
assets in a post-transfer business.
At the same time the Tax Court was examining the interrelationship of the
continuity of business enterprise and business purpose tests in American
Bronze, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also was studying the issue. In
Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States, 80 the transferee and transferor
corporations were wholly owned by the same shareholder. The transferor
corporation, which was insolvent at the time, transferred all of its "assets" to
the transferee in a purported (C) reorganization. The transferee claimed it
was entitled to carr, forward the transferor's net operating losses. 8 1 The
court concluded that the transfer did not constitute a tax-free reorganization
because the insolvent transferor had ceased doing business at the time of the
transfer. The court reasoned that "[l]iquidation of assets is not continuation
of a business enterprise." 82  This statement is merely a variation on the
holding in Standard Realization. The transferor, which was insolvent at the
time of the transfer, had neither a business nor assets to transfer. The trans-
feree, by assuming the transferor's liabilities, suffered a net loss from the
,transaction whether it discharged such liabilities with its own assets or with
the transferor's assets. The sole purpose for the transfer, therefore, was to
permit Wortham to liquidate the transferor's assets, discharge the trans-
feree's liabilities, and carry forward the latter's operating losses. Both the
district and appellate courts concluded that such a transfer lacked business
purpose. 83 In dicta, the Worthain appellate decision went beyond the
lower court's business purpose analysis and hinted that the transaction also
lacked business continuity.8 4  Limited to its business purpose discussion,
79. Interestingly, the court also stated: "'[W]e note, however, that where continuity of busi-
ness enterprise is found, business purpose ordinarily presents no problem." Id. at 1124 n.8.
This statement seems inconsistent with the court's reservation of the business purpose issue.
See also Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d at 648-49. In Estate of Lewis, the First
Circuit noted that continuity of business does not always mean that a reorganization has oc-
curred. Id. It would appear that American Bronze applied the analysis in Estate of Lewis in
reverse. The court had little difficulty finding continuity of business, and it used that fact to
bolster its finding of business purpose.
80. 521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975), affg 375 F. Supp. 835 (D.Wyo. 1974).
81. The transferor was hopelessly insolvent, having assets with a fair market value of
$19,000 and debts in excess of $40,000. Id. at 162. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 252 (the only
apparent reason for the transaction was to transfer the transferor's net operating loss to the
transferee).
82. 521 F.2d at 163. While the court concluded that the transfer was not a (C) reorganiza-
tion, it did not state what it was.
83. Id. See also 375 F. Supp. at 837 (D. Wyo. 1974).
84. 521 F.2d at 163.
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the appellate court's holding in Wortham is consistent with the holdings in
Becher and Revenue Ruling 63-29, both of which involved transferors that
were solvent, valid business purposes, and use by the transferee of the trans-
feror's assets in its post-transfer business.8 5
The two most recent pronouncements by the courts on the continuity of
business enterprise issue only heighten the current confusion between the
business purpose and continuity of business doctrines. In Atlas Tool Co. v.
Commissioner,8 6 both the transferee, Atlas, and the transferor, Fletcher,
were wholly owned by the same shareholder. Fletcher, a solvent corpora-
tion, adopted a plan of liquidation, sold all of its operating assets to Atlas,
and distributed the proceeds to its shareholder.8 7  Fletcher had halted its
business indefinitely at the time of the sale. Fletcher's assets sat idle at
Atlas' plant for approximately four months. Economic conditions during the
succeeding eight months forced Atlas to gradually place all of Fletcher's
equipment in use.8 8 Contrary to its argument in Becher, the IRS con-
tended that the transaction constituted a section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization
and that Fletcher's distribution should have been taxed as a dividend under
section 356.89
The Tax Court looked first at whether Atlas continued Fletcher's pre-
transfer business. The court emphasized, however, that in both Morley Cy-
press Trust and Pebble Springs the newly formed transferee did not continue
the transferor's former business, but rather commenced a new business. 90
Second, the court applied the Becher rationale, that is, that a reorganization
has occurred when a sound business purpose exists for a transfer, the trans-
feree engages in an active business following the transfer (regardless of the
nature of the assets employed in that business), and the transferor's stock-
holders remain in control of the transferee with their investment still in
corporate solution. 91 The court reasoned that the transfer by Fletcher satis-
fied all of these requirements because Atlas used Fletcher's assets, even in
85. See notes 43-53 & 67-70 and accompanying text supra. Clearly, the Worthain opinion
focused on the lack of a business purpose for the transfer. All the reasons for operating the two
businesses as separate entities before the purported reorganization remained after the transfer.
521 F.2d at 163. Wortham is an excellent example of how recent decisions have treated the
business purpose and business continuity tests as interchangeable.
86. 70 T.C. 86 (1978), aff'd, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9177 (3d Cir. 1980).
87. Atlas had formed Fletcher in 1960 to serve as a sUlplier. Because foreign goods could
be obtained at a lower cost, Atlas discontinued purchasing items from Fletcher in 1969. Id. at
89-92.
88. Some of the machinery was still in use at the time of trial. Id. at 95.
89. Id. at 97.
90. The court emphasized that in both of these cases, the transferor either continued some
portion of the transferor's business or employed some portion of the transferor's assets in its
own business. Id. at 101-03. Nevertheless, the court insisted upon analyzing the business con-
tinuity and business purpose doctrines together. The court further compounded the confusion
by stating that the "continuation of the tranferor's business is certainly not a prerequisite to
every imaginable business purpose .... " Id. at 102. It is very difficult to reconcile this state-
ment with the court's search for business continuity.
91. The court added:
The fact that Fletcher's business activity was halted indefinitely and that the assets
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their idle state, to reduce its business risks. 92 The court distinguished
Worthain on the grounds that it addressed only the business purpose issue,
not business continuity. 93 Based on all of these factors, the Tax Court held
that the transfer in Atlas was a valid type (D) reorganization. 94
The language of the Third Circuit's affirmance in Atlas, however, raises
serious doubt that the appellate court considered business purpose and con-
tinuitV of business enterprise as separate doctrines. The court stated: the
shareholder's "business purpose, to provide a hedge against interruption in
supplies, carried forward the continuity of enterprise from Fletcher to At-
las." 95  This statement ignores two basic premises of the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise doctrine, namely, that business continuity and business pur-
pose are independent doctrines 96 and that business continuity should be
determined at the time of the transfer, not four months later. 97 As a result,
Atlas may be read as supporting the proposition that only minimal business
continuity is necessary for tax-free reorganization treatment if a valid busi-
ness purpose exists for the transfer. Nothing in Atlas intimates that the na-
ture or quantity of the assets transferred by Fletcher to Atlas controlled the
outcome in the decision.
The most recent business continuity decision, Laure v. Commissioner,98
contains some unfortunate dicta. In Laure, Lakala, an insolvent corporation,
merged into W-L Molding, both of which were wholly owned by the tax-
payer. Prior to the merger, Lakala sold most of its operating assets and
negotiated sales of most of its remaining assets.99 Following the merger,
W-L sold the remainder of Lakala's accounts receivable and assets, leased
W-L's real property to a wholly owned subsidiary, and sold those of its own
assets which were used in repairing Lakala's machinery to J-G, another cor-
poration controlled by Laure. The IRS alleged that Lakala had de facto ter-
transferred were inactive when received are no more significant here than was the
fact that the principal assets transferred in Becher were cash or assets expected to
be converted to cash. In both cases, the particular assets were transferred for
reasons germane to the business actively conducted by the transferee ....
Id. at 104. This language flies squarely in the face of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d). See text
accompanying notes 8-9 & 15-16 supra. The importance of Atlas cannot be stressed enough.
Atlas focuses the continuity of business enterprise test squarely on the post-transfer activities
conducted by the transferee. To the extent these activities constitute a continuing business,
Atlas places little significance on the nature of the assets transferred by the transferor.
92. 70 T.C at 104.
93. Id. at 105.
94. Id.
95. 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,235-36.
96. Both Atlas, 70 T.C. at 100 and American Bronze, 64 T.C. at 1123 held that the two
doctrines are separate. See also Tarleau, supra note 30, at 801 (the two doctrines are separate).
97. Standard Realization clearly held that business continuity is to be determined at the
time of transfer. 10 T.C. at 708. The Third Circuit in Atlas avoided this issue by concluding that
the transferee's use of the transferor's assets as a form of insurance had commenced with the
date of the transfer. 80-1 U.S.T.C at 83,236.
98. 70 T.C. 1087 (1978), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
99. Id. at 1095. In January 1972, Lakala deeded its land to W-L. Between January and April
1972, Lakala sold most of its operating assets. Id.
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minated its business prior to the merger and that the merger failed the
continuity of business enterprise test. 100 The court concluded that Laure
had used W-L as a conduit to liquidate Lakala's assets and to discharge Laka-
la's debts. 101 The court therefore disallowed W-L's carryforward of Lakala's
pre-merger losses. 102
The court in Laure relied on a curious amalgam of precedents to support
its conclusion. First, it cited American Bronze and Becher for the proposi-
tion that the continuity of business test did not require the transferee to a
reorganization to conduct the same business as the transferor. 103 The Laure
court's characterization of Becher as involving an active business enterprise
at the time of the transfer, however, is highly questionable. 104 In the same
paragraph, the court also cited Standard Realization and Atlas for the rule
that: "[I]f the transferor's business is not continued there must be some use
of the transferor's assets in the transferee's business. Continuity of business
is lacking if the transferee ...merely is to dispose of the transferor's assets
in an orderly termination of the transferor's business."' 10 5 This statement is
highly significant. Laure only referred to the transferor's business or assets,
not to its "historic" business or "historic" assets. Viewed in this light, the
court properly cited the holdings in Standard Realization and Atlas. Nothing
in either of these two decisions would support a more restrictive interpreta-
tion of the business continuity test. Nor did the court attempt to exclude
cash or marketable securities from the definition of the term "assets." In
short, Laure reaches the same conclusion as Worthain, that is, that an insol-
vent corporation has no assets to transfer in a merger and, therefore, no
business purpose exists for such a transfer. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the court in Laure conceded that its discussion of the continuity
of business enterprise doctrine was-only dicta, stating: "We agree ... the
merger ... had no business purpose. In addition, though respondent did
not press this point, the merger lacked continuity of business enter-
prise." 106 Thus, the Laure court's statements do not retreat from the hold-
ings in Becher or Revenue Ruling 63-29, both of which ignored the nature of
the assets transferred and focused only on the continuity of business issue.
100. Id. at 1102.
101. Id. at 1104. The Laure court invoked the conduit doctrine of Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (distribution to shareholders of assets subject to a prearranged
resale is actually a sale by the distributing corporation). 70 T.C. at 1104. It is difficult to under-
stand how imputing the sale by Lakala to W-L affects the continuity of business enterprise issue
in light of Becher.
102. 70 T.C. at 1107.
103. Id. at 1103.
104. By assuming that Sponge-Aire was still an active business enterprise, the court seems to
have assumed that a transfer of cash satisfies the continuity of business enterprise test. See
Becher v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. at 932.
105. 70 T.C. at 1103. This statement clearly contradicts Becher, Rev. Rul. 63-29, a ruling not
discussed in Laure, and the Tax Court's interpretation of Becher in Atlas. See notes 50-53 and
text accompanying notes 50-53, 67-70 & 92 supra.
106. 70 T.C. at 1107.
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Even assuming that lack of continuity of business enterprise served as an
alternative ground for the holding in Laure, the court's analysis is consistent
with prior case law. The court discussed Becher primarily in the context of
the liquidating corporation rule of Standard Realization, not the continuity
of business enterprise test. 107 While continuity of business enterprise lan-
guage pervades the Laure decision, 108 the court relied primarily on the
rationale of Wortham, that an insolvent corporation which engages in a pur-
ported reorganization merely to discharge its debts has not engaged in a
bona fide reorganization. 109 At most, Laure stands for the proposition that
a purported merger of an insolvent corporation into a solvent corporation
lacks business purpose. 110 Any other interpretation of Laure would lead to
the erroneous conclusion that Laure cited Becher with approval but reached
a conclusion that most commentators thought Becher rejected. 111
Proposed Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-1(d):
A Regulation Without Precedent
The validity of proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) is highly
questionable. Decisions and rulings prior to 1964 interpreted the continuity
of business enterprise test as only requiring the transferee to a purported
reorganization to engage in some business activity, using some of the trans-
feror's assets, following the transfer. 112 In Morley Cypress Trust, Bentsen,
and Pebble Springs, the courts did not focus on the nature of the assets
transferred by the transferors. The Becher case and, indirectly, Revenue
Ruling 63-29, flatly rejected any interpretation of the continuity of business
107. Summarizing, the Laure court stated: "Continuity of business is lacking ... if the trans-
feree . . . is merely to dispose of the transferor's assets to unrelated parties in an orderly termi-
nation of the transferor's business." Id. at 1103. Later in the opinion, the court restated its
concern more strongly: "The facts ... reveal a termination of Lakala's business, that is, a sale of
its assets to outsiders and payment of Lakala's creditors." Id. at 1104.
108. The court rejected all of the alleged business purposes for the reorganization proferred
by the taxpayer. The purported merger did not result in continued air transport capability of
W-L, duplicative expenses were eliminated because Lakala was liquidated, not because of a
reorganization, and the merger failed to improve W-L's financial position. Id. at 1106-07.
109. Id. at 1104.
110. Id. at 1107. In conclusion, the court stated: "W-L . . . is not entitled to deduct Lakala's
net operating loss carryovers because . . . the merger . . . had no business purpose." Id. In
effect, the court reached the same result as in the Worthain decision. See notes 80-85 and
accompanying text supra.
111. See Ross, supra note 68, at 131 (review of Becher); Tarleau, supra note 30, at 805-06
(requirement satisfied regardless of the business in which the acquiring company engages). See
also Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 103 (transfer of primarily cash qualified as a (C)
reorganization).
112. See notes 22-70 and accompanying text supra. See also Ross, supra note 68, at 131 (Rev.
Rul. 63-29 also should apply to (A), (B), and (D) reorganizations); Tarleau, supra note 30, at 805
(continuity of business requires that the transferee be intended to be a permanent enterprise
and engage in the active conduct of some business other than the mere liquidation of the assets
transferred to it).
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enterprise test requiring the transferee to conduct the transferor's historic
business or to use its historic assets. In both instances, a sale of assets for
cash immediately before the purported reorganization had no impact on the
reorganization status of the transfer. Finally, the Standard Realization line of
precedent only applies to a purported reorganization in which the transferee
corporation's sole post-reorganization activity consists of completing the
liquidation of the transferor. 113 Standard Realization arid its successor cases
say nothing about the nature of the business the transferee must conduct or
the nature of the assets the transferor must transfer in order to satisfy the
continuity of business enterprise requirement.
The post-1964 decisions often have confused business purpose with busi-
ness continuity but have departed little from the principles enunciated in
Standard Realization, Becher, and Revenue Ruling 63-29. No recent deci-
sion has denied reorganization treatment to a transaction which served a
business purpose but involved only minimum business continuity. In both
Atlas and American Bronze, minimal continuity of business enterprise and
business purpose were present. l14 Both cases appear to view these two
doctrines as different facets of a much broader business purpose doctrine but
neither departs from traditional interpretations of the two judicial doctrines.
Language in the Laure decision which indirectly supports the test adopted
in the proposed regulation is only dicta. Moreover, the conclusion in Laure
is based primarily on the business purpose test. 115  Dicta in the Wortham deci-
sion, which also indirectly supports the proposed regulation, also may be
distinguished on the ground that the court therein relied exclusively on the
business purpose doctrine. Wortham and Laure both may be distinguished
on the ground that the transferors were insolvent at the time of the pur-
ported reorganization and had no "net assets" to transfer to their respective
transferees.11 6 Nature and quantity of assets become irrelevant if the trans-
feror owns no net assets. In effect, Worthain and Laure merely reaffirm,
albeit indirectly; the general rule of Standard Realization.
Finally, Private Letter Rulings 7825045 and 7829097 stand in direct oppo-
sition to the proposed regulation. 117  In both of these rulings, the IRS de-
termined that a sale of assets for cash followed by an exchange of that cash
solely for voting stock of the transferee satisfied all of the statutory and judi-
113. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 71-79 & 86-97 and accompanying text supra. In both decisions, the transferee
either conducted some portion of the transferor's former business or employed some portion of
the transferor's assets in its own business.
115. See notes 98-111 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text supra. See also Freeman, supra note 3, at 253.
The author stated that :
[P]ermanent suspension of the transferor's business activities without expectation of
adopting any other profit-making activities because of hopeless insolvency militates
against bona fide business purpose and manifests that the transferee is being used
only as a conduit to liquidate the transferor, which otherwise would have ceased to
exist as a viable entity when its assets were dissipated on its excessive liabilities.
Id.
117. See notes 3 & 6 and text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
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cial requirements of section 368(a)(1)(C). The following statement from Pri-
vate Letter Ruling 7825045 is particularly damaging to proposed Treasury
Regulation section 1.368-1(d)'s position:
It is anticipated that the proposed transaction will provide the
[transferor's shareholders] with a more attractive corporate invest-
ment from the standpoint of current income, liquidity, diversifica-
tion and stability. The [transferee's] investment of the cash re-
ceived from the [transferor] will enable it to increase the value of
its portfolio, which will result in a lower per share expense ratio,
thereby providing shareholders- with a higher yield and . . . [a]
more attractive . . . investment vehicle . . . . There is no plan on
the part of the transferee to discontinue its activities and it will
invest or otherwise utilize the cash received fiom [the transferor]
in connection with such business. 118
Thus, the IRS appears to have conceded in Private Letter Ruling 7825045
that cash company (C) reorganizations satisfy both the business purpose and
the continuity of business enterprise doctrines.
In summary, proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) derives little
support from the continuity of business enterprise case law. Only in Becher
and Private Letter Rulings 7825045 and 7929097 did the court and the IRS
directly address the issue of whether a transfer of cash in exchange solely for
the transferee's voting stock constituted a valid reorganization. Each of these
authorities ignored the preceding cash sale of assets and held that the sub-
sequent transfer of cash qualified as a tax-free (C) reorganization. These
precedents demonstrate that the business continuity test, if it is to retain any
vitality, must be analyzed separately from the business purpose issue. It is
one thing to deny reorganization treatment to a transaction that lacks busi-
ness purpose and fails the continuity of business test. It is quite another to
hold that a stock for assets exchange between a cash company and an in-
vestment company, following which the transferee actively engages in a bus-
iness, also fails to qualify as a reorganization. No decision has gone so far and
it is doubtful that the regulations should depart from forty-five years of prior
case law.
RECENT LEGISLATION: ANTI-SWAP FUNDS
During 1960, the IRS issued a number of rulings to the effect that an
exchange of appreciated stocks and securities for a controlling interest in an
investment company qualified as a tax-free exchange under Code section
351. 119 Investment companies formed or operated in such manner became
118. Private Letter Ruling 7825045 (March 23, 1978).
119. I.R.C. § 351(a). This section provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if property
is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities
in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such persons own at least 80% of the
voting power and at least 80% of the total number of shares of the corporation. Id. See Caplin,
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known as "swap-funds." In Revenue Procedure 62-32, 120 the IRS announced
that it would no longer rule on the tax-free nature of such transactions. On
July 14, 1966, the Service announced in proposed Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.351-1(c) that it would prospectively treat such exchanges as taxable
transactions. 121
In the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966,122 Congress enacted the prede-
cessor to section 351(d) and denied tax-free treatment under section 351
to post-June 30, 1967 swap-fund exchanges. 123 Treasury Regulation section
1.351-1(c) states that a transaction will be considered to be a transfer to an
investment company if:
(i) The transfer results, directly or indirectly, in diversification of
the transferors' interests, and
(ii) The transferee is a (a) regulated investment company, (b) a
real estate investment trust, or (c) a corporation more than 80 per-
cent of the value of whose assets (excluding cash . . .) are held for
investment and are readily marketable stocks or securities .... 124
Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, 20 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX 24 (1962) (discussion of the 1960 Centennial Fund rulings in which the IRS
sanctioned § 351 treatment for transfers of securities to a new mutual fund); Proposed 351 Regs.
Could Kill Tax Benefits of Swap Funds, 25 J. TAX. 151 (1966) (discussion of the Centennial
Fund rulings); Warwick Fund Ruling Withdrawn; IRS Policy Questioned, 19 J. TAX 197 (1963)
(discussion of the Centennial rulings); New Centennial-Type Mutual Fund Forms Without Rul-
ing, 15 J. Tax. 382 (1961).
120. 1962-2 C.B. 527, 530 (the IRS refused to issue advance rulings on whether transfers of
appreciated stocks or securities to a newly organized investment company in exchange for stock,
as a result of solicitation by brokers or promoters, would qualify as tax-free § 351 exchanges).
121. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c), [1966] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 8950, provided:
(c) Section 351 does not provide nonrecognition treatment to a transaction which
is in substance a device, or the net effect of which is, to achieve an immediate or
delayed market place sale or exchange of stock or securities .... Thus, section 351
does not apply to the transfer by taxpayers of stock or securities to a corporation
which is an investment company, in exchange for stock or-securities (redeemable at
the holder's option) in such corporation, if the transfer was solicited or arranged by
a broker or similar intermediary and if the filing of a prospectus with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (or any State agency performing similar functions) was
required in connection with the transaction.
See also T.I.R. No. 832, [1966] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6658; T.I.R. No. 6708. id. at
6707 (modification of closing agreement conditions); T.I.R. No. 6768, id. at 6768 (modifica-
tion of closing agreement conditions). The regulation was amended to its current language by
T.D. 6942, [1967] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6502.
122. Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 203, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966). See also 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(48)(B), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). This statute amended § 351(d) to read: "This
section shall not apply to a transfer of property to an investment company."
123. For a discussion of § 351(d), see Schechtman, Economic and Equity Implications of the
Recent Legislation Concerning Swap Funds, 45 TAXES 550 (1967) (discussions of the economic
evils inherent in swap funds).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1967) (emphasis added). Stocks and securities will be
considered readily marketable if traded on an exchange or quoted in the over-the-counter mar-
ket. Stocks and securities will be considered to be held for investment unless held primarily for
sale to customers or used in the trade or business of banking, insurance, brokerage, or similar
business. Id. § 1.351-1(c)(3).
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Thus, the prohibited type of diversification results under § 351(d) if two or
more persons transfer nonidentical assets to a corporation in exchange for
stock, and following the transaction, control the transferee. If there is only
one transferor to a newly organized corporation, however, the transfer gen-
erally will not be treated as resulting in diversification. Finally, a transfer,
which does not by itself result in diversification but is part of an overall plan
that will result in diversification, is also not entitled to tax-free treatment
under section 351.125
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976,126 Congress extended the anti-swap fund
provision of section 351(d) to certain types of reorganizations under section
368.127 Section 368(a)(2)(F) makes a statutory merger or other exchange of
stock or assets for stock of the acquiring company taxable to the nondiver-
sified investment company if the exchange involves two or more investment
companies. 1 28
Section 368(a)(2)(F) defines an "investment company" as a regulated in-
vestment company or a corporation, fifty percent or more of the value of
whose assets consist of stocks or securities and eighty percent or more of the
value of whose assets are held for investment. 129 In determining whether a
corporation qualifies as an investment company, cash, cash equivalents, and
United States Government securities are excluded from the fifty and eighty
percent tests. 13 0  Thus, exchanges by corporations owning certain highly
liquid assets are excluded definitionally from section 368(a)(2)(F)'s prohibi-
tion. For example, section 368(a)(2)(F) is inapplicable to reorganizations be-
tween two or more diversified investment companies, 31 an active business
125. Id. § 1.351-I(c)(5). See also id. § 1.351-1(c)(2). This section states that the determina-
tion of whether a corporation is an investment company will ordinarily be made immediately
after the transfer. However, if circumstances change pursuant to a plan in effect at the time of
the transfer, the determination shall be made at the later date. For a brief discussion of these
rules, see Technical Advice Memorandum 7936076 (April 30, 1979) (investment of post-transfer
corporate earnings is irrelevant; § 351(d) is aimed at the initial pooling of marketable stocks and
securities by several transferors).
126. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2131, 90 Stat. 455 (1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)).
127. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F). This section is aimed directly at the situation where numerous
investors, each holding appreciated stock of a single corporation, separately incorporate their
investments and thereby avoid § 351(d) under the single transferor exception and, after a suffi-
cient interval, merge their corporations. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 661 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION]. The enactment of I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F) was prompted by
Rev. Rul. 74-155, 1974-1 C.B. 86, in which the IRS sanctioned tax-free treatment for such a
transaction under § 368(a)(1)(C). See the discussion in Freeman, supra note 3, at 240-43, 246.
128. To avoid circumvention of its prohibition, section .368(a)(2)(F) also applies to reverse
acquisitions, See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(vi). See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127, at
615 (designed to assure that whether the investment company is in form the acquired or acquir-
ing party, the tax result will be the same).
129. Id. § 368(a)(2)(F)(iii).
130. Id. § 368(a)(2)(F)(iv). See Freeman, supra note 3, at 243.
131. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127, at 662, 666. If the merger involves two
nondiversified investment companies, however, the merger will be taxable for both parties. Id.
This results because the triggering event for § 368(a)(2)(F) is an exchange between two or more
investment companies, at least one of which is non-diversified before the exchange, regardless
of intent and regardless of diversification of the transferor's interests after the exchange. Coin-
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enterprise and a diversified investment company, 1 32 a non-diversified in-
vestment company and an active business enterprise,1 33 and two or more
active business enterprises. 134 Thus, by reason of the definition of "invest-
ment company" a corporation holding cash will not run afoul of section
368(a)(2)(F) unless the transfer it engages in involved two or more invest-
ment companies, at least one of which is non-diversified. 135
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy described the intended
scope of section 368(a)(2)(F) in his remarks before the House Ways and
Means Committee during the 1976 hearings on investment company reor-
ganizations as follows:
[A] corporation which sold its assets in a (C) reorganization
... and retained the acquiring corporation's stock could now be
merged tax-free into a mutual fund ....
There are many mergers that . . fall within the language of
the proposed amendment ... which seem to fit both the letter
and the spirit of the reorganization provisions. That is there are
real business purposes in terms of economy of scale [and] better
investment management that have nothing to do with the swap
funding device .... 136
[E7]ven in our view a rule which would deny reorganization
treatment only to mergers between personal holding companies
would be too broad. For example if the personal holding company
... had no substantial net appreciation in its assets, the swap
funding rules should not apply. Such mergers might very well take
place . . . to achieve more experienced asset management .... 137
Thus, it would appear that the Treasury Department was concerned in 1976
only with the purported business reasons for merging cash companies, non-
diversified investment companies, or personal holding companies into diver-
sified investment companies, notwithstanding whether such transfers vio-
lated continuity of business enterprise principles. Nothing in the above
statements reflects a concern on the part of the Treasury that a transfer of
"cash" cannot be considered a transfer of an asset under section 368. If any-
thing, the Deputy Assistant's statements reflect opposition by the Treasury
Department to the definition of business continuity now offered by the IRS
in proposed section 1.368-1(d).
pare I.R.C. § 351(d) (test for diversification after the transfer) with id. § 368(a)(2)(F). See notes
121-125 and accompanying text supra.
132. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127, at 665-66.
133. Id. at 666. However, if the reorganization involved three parties consisting of two non-
diversified investment companies and an active business enterprise, the exchange would be
taxable for both investment companies. Id.
134. By definition, § 368(a)(2)(F) requires two or more investment companies.
135. The legislative history to section 368(a)(2)(F)(i) emphasizes that, if a non-diversified com-
pany engages in a reorganization with a diversified investment company, tax-free treatment will
be denied only to the non-diversified party. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127, at 665-66.
136. Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 11920, Taxation of
Exchange (Swap) Fund Capital Gains, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) (statement of Mr. Gold-
stel,, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy) (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 13.
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In 1966 and again in 1976, Congress had ample opportunity to extend
section 351(d)'s prohibition to include transfers of cash to controlled corpora-
tions, but it chose not to do so. 138 Similarly, Congress had the opportunity
in 1976 to include (A) or (C) reorganizations between cash companies and
diversified investment companies within the prohibition of section
368(a)(2)(F). Nevertheless, Congress, at the urging of the Treasury Depart-
ment, chose to exclude such transactions from the ambit of the statute. 139
The very fact that legislation was needed in both these instances underscores
the questionable validity of proposed section 1.368-1(d). By statute, Con-
gress has denied reorganization treatment to certain types of exchanges in-
volving two or more investment companies. There is no reason now for the
IRS to expand that prohibition by regulation to transactions outside the
reach of the statute. Such expansion is in contravention of the congressional
intent behind sections 351(d) and 368(a)(2)(F).
PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATION
SECTION 1.368-1(d): EXAMPLES
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) contains five examples of
the business continuity and asset continuity tests. Examples 1140 and 2141
reflect current case law. Examples 3-5, however, represent significant depar-
tures from the precedent and are worthy of a more detailed discussion.
Example 3 involves a corporation (T), which manufactures men's trousers.
As part of a plan of reorganization, T sold all of its assets for cash on January
1, 1980 and reinvested all of the sales proceeds in marketable stocks and
bonds. On July 1, 1980, T transferred its assets to U, a regulated investment
company, for U voting stock. Example 3 concludes that T's investment activ-
138. See Private Letter Ruling 7936076 (April 30, 1979) (§ 351(d) aimed at diversifications of
stock or securities).
139. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(iv) specifically excludes cash or cash items from the calculation of
total assets. Thus, a company owning only cash will not be an investment company.
140. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example t. In this example, P conducts three lines of
business, all approximately equal in value. On July 1, 1981, P sells two of the lines to a third
party for cash. On December 31, 1981, P transfers its remaining line of business to Q. Thereaf-
ter, Q continues the business uninterrupted. The proposed regulation holds that continuity of
business enterprise is satisfied. Example 1 merely restates the holdings in Estate of Lewis v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949) and American Bronze
Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 111 (1975), that the transferee may satisfy the business con-
tinuity test by conducting only one of the transferor's former lines of business. See notes 38-42 &
71-79 and accompanying text supra.
141. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example 2. In this example, R manufactures comput-
ers and S manufactures computer components. S supplies all of R's components. In January
1981, R discontinues purchasing components from S. In March 1981, S merges into R, and R
retains S's equipment as a backup source. The proposed regulation holds that the retention of
S's assets as backup material satisfies the continuity of business enterprise test. These are basi-
caily the facts of Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978), aff'd, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9177
(3d Cir. 1980). See notes 86-97 and accompanying text supra. The example, however, is more
liberal than the holding in Atlas insofar as it does not require the transferee to ever actually
place the transferor's equipment in use.
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ity is not its historic business and the stock portfolio is not T's historic busi-
ness asset. 
142
The facts of Example 3 closely resemble those of Becher and Private Let-
ter Rulings 7825045 and 7829097,143 which all reached conclusions contrary
to that of the Example. Leaving aside this inconsistency, the Example suffers
from a second equally serious flaw; it fails to identify how long a corporation
must engage in an activity before that activity becomes its historic business.
Example 3 suggests that the length of time a corporation engages in a busi-
ness activity is irrelevant if the activity was initiated as part of the plan of
reorganization. This is clearly inconsistent with the holdings of numerous
private rulings that at some point (6 years after the sale being the shortest)
management of an investment portfolio should become a corporation's his-
toric business. 144
More importantly, Example 3 suggests that investment activity will
never constitute a transferor's historic business if it arose out of the sale by
the transferor of its active business assets and was "part of an overall plan" of
reorganization. 145 At what point, however, will a plan of reorganization
exist? 1 46  Can an extended period of time between the actual exchange and
the prior sale of assets purge the tainted purpose? 147 Can the transferor
avoid the proposed regulation by retaining a portion of its active assets and
transferring those assets along with its cash to the transferee? 148  If so, what
142. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example 3.
143. See notes 3-4, 5-6 & 53 and accompanying text supra. It is crucial that in each of these
precedents the transferee sold substantially all of its assets prior to the purported reorganiza-
tion.
144. But see Private Letter Ruling 7910041 (Dec. 7, 1978). In this ruling, X sold its active
business assets in 1972 and invested the proceeds in tax-exempt bonds. In 1978, X transferred
its bonds to Y, an investment company, in exchange solely for Y voting stock. The IRS held
that this was a valid (C) reorganization. In Private Letter Ruling 7926150 (March 30, 1979), X
sold its active business assets in 1973 for cash and invested in securities. In 1979, X will transfer
its investment to Y, an investment company, solely for Y voting stock. This also was held to be
a valid (C) reorganization. Private Letter Ruling 7851066 (Sept. 21, 1978), involved a plan which
was held to be a tax-free merger. In this ruling, X sold its assets for cash in 1961 and merged
into Y, an investment company, in 1977. While all of these rulings involve time periods in
excess of three years, they do recognize that investment activity may become a corporation's
primary business following a sale of its active business assets.
145. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1. 368-1(d)(3)(iii). The proposed regulation states that all the facts
and circumstances will be considered in determining whether a "plan of reorganization" exists.
Id.
146. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 104, suggests that the only real inquiry is
whether the transfer was germane to the business activities of the parties. See note 91 supra.
Thus, the issue is not whether a plan exists, but whether the plan of reorganization is really a
disguise for a liquidation followed by a purchase of the transferree's stock by the transferee's
shareholders.
147. See note 147 supra.
148. See Becher v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (the
transferor exchanged primarily cash and assets to be sold by the transferee). See notes 43-53 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 8 supra for a discussion of the Atlas holding that the
fact that the assets transferred in Becher were cash was irrelevant.
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percentage will suffice? None of these questions are answered by the
regulation except for its statement that forty-two months between a sale of
assets and a purported reorganization is insufficient to satisfy the continuity
of business enterprise test where a plan of reorganization existed at the time
of sale. In light of prior authorities, this position is untenable. 149
Example 4 of the proposed regulation involves two corporations, V, which
manufactures toys, and W, which distributes steel. 150  On January 1, 1981,
V will sell its assets for cash and notes and, on March 1, 1981, will merge
into W. Example 4 concludes that continuity of business enterprise is lack-
ing. The facts of Example 4 resemble those of Revenue Ruling 63-29,151 but
are clearly distinguishable. Example 4, unlike Revenue Ruling 63-29, which
involved a (C) reorganization, involves a purported tax-free merger. The
more important distinction, however, is that in Example 4 the transferor is
the party that sells its assets and transfers the proceeds to the transferee. In
Revenue Ruling 63-29, the transferee sold its assets and acquired the trans-
feror's historic business. The fhcts of Revenue Ruling 63-29 even today would
satisfy both the business and asset continuity tests of the proposed regula-
tion. Not only did the transferee in the ruling use the transferor's historic
assets, it actually continued the transferor's historic business. 152 The facts of
Example 4, unlike those in Revenue Ruling 63-29, purportedly do not satisfy
either of the proposed regulation's tests. To this extent, Example 4 is subject
to the same criticisms as Example 3. While the interval between the sale of
assets for cash and subsequent merger in Example 4 is only two months
instead of forty-two months as in Example 3, does this matter if the test is
business continuity or asset continuity? 13 At what point will investment
activity become the transferor's historic business? Example 4, like Example
3, fails to address these issues.
149. See notes 3-4 & 5-6 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the 1978 letter
rulings.
150. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example 4.
151. 63-1 C.B 77. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
152. Example 4 is basically Example 3 with a purported merger substituted in the former for
the latter's stock for assets exchange. The facts of Rev. Rul. 63-29, 63-1 C.B. 77, however, fall
squarely outside of the proposed regulation. Nevertheless, the IRS suspended Revenue Ruling
63-29 at the same time that it released Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d). Rev. Rul. 79-433,
1979-53 I.R.B. 13 (suspension pending completion of the proposed regulation). The apparent
rationale of Example 4 is that Standard Realization Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 623 (1938),
acq. 1938-2 C.B 13, prohibits reorganization treatment for transactions where either the trans-
feree or the transferor sells the transferor's assets. This alone is a questionable interpretation of
Standard Realization. Application of the Standard Realization rationale to the facts of Revenue
Ruling 63-29 is even more questionable. The basic premise of Standard Realization is that the
transferee is to be disregarded if its'sole function consists of liquidating the transferor. See notes
31-34 and accompanying text supra. Standard Realization, therefore, should be inapplicable
where the transferee actually conducts an active business following the purported reorganiza-
tion.
153. In both Examples, the sale of assets was part of the plan of reorganization. In the 1978
letter rulings, however, the IRS disregarded the relationship between the sale and subsequent
exchange. See the discussion of Private Letter Ruling 7829097 (April 24, 1978) and Private
Letter Ruling 7825045 (March 23, 1978) at notes 3-4 & 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
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Examples 3 and 4 also fail to address the issue of when, if ever, the trans-
feree's use of the transferor's cash will satisfy the asset continuity test. Argu-
ably, the transferee, assuming it is an investment company, always will be
able to use the transferor's cash in its investment activities. 154  The reverse
side of this issue is when will cash and/or stocks and securities become the
transferor's historic business assets. Assuming that use of the transferor's
cash in the transferee's business will not satisfy the asset continuity test, the
proposed regulation fails to define what constitutes use by the transferee of a
"significant portion" of the transferor's historic business assets. The regula-
tion offers no guidance as to what percentage, if any, of its historic business
assets the transferor may convert into cash without violating the "significant
portion" test. 155
The following example demonstrates the major flaw in Examples 3 and 4.
A owns 100% of the stock of corporations X and Y, both of which are sol-
vent, active business enterprises. X manufactures steel and Y sells steel
products. Y sells its assets for cash and merges into X. Under Examples 3
and 4 of the proposed regulation, this transaction satisfies neither the busi-
ness continuity nor the asset continuity test. Nevertheless, A's investment
remains in corporate solution, Y has transferred "assets" to X without A ever
being legally entitled to receive cash payments, and X continues its historic
business. If a reorganization has not occurred it is because business purpose
is lacking for such a transfer, not because the transferee has failed to use the
transferor's assets. 156 The real issue is whether the transferor shareholders
have cloaked the complete termination of their entire business in the guise
of a tax-free reorganization. 157 The facts of this hypothetical do not present
a Standard Realization-type transaction, wherein no business purpose for the
transfer existed and, following the transfer and completion of the liquidation
of the transferor's assets, neither the transferee nor the transferor remained
in existence.158  How do these facts differ from the situation in which Y sells
its assets, purchases property that X is interested in, and merges into X? No
decision ever has denied reorganization status to such a transfer.
Theoretically, if asset or business continuity are the tests, whether the cash sale and purported
reorganization are related or not is irrelevant. Consequently, whether the interval is six months
or two months between sale and reorganization should be of little relevance. Where Examples 3
and 4 diverge is that the latter involved a two month interval and the former a 42 month
interval. The latter example is therefore particularly questionable.
154. See the discussion of Private Letter Rulings 7829097 and 7825045 at notes 3-4 & 5-6 and
accompanying text supra.
155. In Becher, the transferor converted over 90% of its assets into cash or cash equivalents.
22 T.C. at 937. See notes 43-53 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 22-119 and accompanying text supra.
157. This is exactly the analysis suggested in Becher and Atlas. See Atlas Tool Co. v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C. at 104 (shareholder's investment remained in corporate solution and the
transfer was germane to the business actively conducted by the transferee); Becher v. Commis-
sioner 22 T.C. at 941 (transferor shareholders' investment remained in corporate solution).
158. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
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While Examples 3 and 4 may produce the correct result, they do'so for
the wrong reason. If the presence of both business purpose and continuity of
business enterprise is the real issue, the Wortham and Laure decisions
adequately respond to it without distorting the traditional notions of con-
tinuity of business enterprise.159 While Worthaw and Laure focus on insol-
vent transferors, there is no reason to believe that insolvency is the only
indicia of lack of business purpose.
Example 5, the last example under the proposed regulation, involves X, a
manufacturer of farm machinery, and Y, a mill operator. X and Y merge and,
immediately thereafter, Y sells all of the X assets. The example concludes
that continuity of business enterprise is lacking. 160  Example 5, like Exam-
ples 3 and 4, overstates the current case law. The precedents hold that, if a
transferor liquidates and the transferee's sole activity following a purported
reorganization consists of completing the liquidation of the transferor's as-
sets, the transfer will fail the business continuity test. 16 1 The cases do not
hold that such a transfer fails the business continuity test simply because the
transferor's assets were sold. Rather, it is the nature of the transferee's post-
transfer activity and the assets used therein that are controlling. Only where
the transferee fails to engage in any active post-transfer activity have the
courts denied reorganization treatment to the transfer. The Wortham and
Laure cases indirectly support this position insofar as they denied reorgani-
zation treatment to transactions having minimal business continuity but no
business purpose.162 Assuming a valid business purpose for the transfer and
immediate resale, even the Laure and Worthain decisions do not support
Example 5.
CONCLUSION
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(d) finds little support in the
continuity of business enterprise case law or recent congressional anti-swap
fund legislation. The preceding discussion demonstrates that continuity of
business enterprise is purely a judicial creation. Congress has limited its
brief excursions into this area to certain carefully defined transactions. Pro-
posed section 1.368-1(d), to the extent it extends beyond congressional and
judicial interpretations of the continuity of business enterprise doctrine, rep-
resents an unbridled usurpation by the IRS of both the legislative and judi-
cial functions. If the IRS now chooses to disagree with its earlier private
ruling position, the basis for doing so is either the business purpose doctrine
or new legislation. Legislative regulations that break new ground with re-
spect to a forty-five year old judicial doctrine should be beyond even the
authority of the IRS.
159. See notes 80-85 & 98-111 and accompanying text supra. Even these two decisions, how-
ever, might well be limited to their facts-insolvent transferors.
160. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), Example 5.
161. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 80-85 & 98-111 and accompanying text supra.
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